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DLD-139        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-3274 
___________ 
 
EDWARD THOMAS KENNEDY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 5:18-cv-04071) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gerald J. Pappert 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 21, 2019 
 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed August 14, 2019) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Edward Kennedy appeals from the dismissal of his complaint for 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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lack of standing.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s judgment. 
In September 2018, Kennedy filed a complaint in the District Court, challenging a 
Pennsylvania statute that criminalizes harassment.  He argues that he is entitled to 
challenge the statute as “one of the people of Pennsylvania” because the statute “exceeds 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania[’s] . . . jurisdiction” and thus “the Plaintiff (and all 
of we the people) is injured” due to a “loss of rights.”  Compl. at 1.  Additionally, 
Kennedy contends that “prosecuting attorneys employed by the [Commonwealth] settle 
95% or mo[r]e of all criminal cases based on reliable sources plaintiff believes are 
credible.”  Id. at 2.  Ultimately, the District Court screened Kennedy’s complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed it without prejudice after 
concluding that Kennedy lacked standing to pursue his claims.  Kennedy timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  We exercise 
                                              
1  “Generally, an order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final nor 
appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the 
cause of action,” unless “the plaintiff cannot amend or declares his intention to stand on 
his complaint.”  Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam).  However, this principle does not apply “where the district court has dismissed 
based on justiciability and it appears that the plaintiff[] could do nothing to cure the[] 
complaint.”  Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 
1461 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994).  In this case, the District Court dismissed Kennedy’s complaint 
without prejudice and granted him 30 days to amend his complaint in an abundance of 
caution due to his pro se status, but there was no apparent basis upon which Kennedy 
could establish that he had standing to proceed.  Further, even if the rule of Borelli 
applied here, Kennedy chose not to amend his complaint within the time given by the 
District Court and instead pursued this appeal, indicating his intention to stand on his 
complaint.  See Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he 
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plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Kennedy’s complaint for lack of 
standing.  N. Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., 801 F.3d 369, 371 (3d Cir. 2015).  
We may summarily affirm a district court’s decision “on any basis supported by the 
record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 
F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary to the 
resolution of cases and controversies.  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  “That case-or-controversy 
requirement is satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing.”  Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. 
v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008).  To establish Article III standing, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) . . . an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
judicial decision.”  Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2017).  The 
alleged injury to the plaintiff must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.”  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014).  
Accordingly, a plaintiff lacks standing to raise “a generally available grievance about 
government” that “claim[s] only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper 
application of the Constitution and laws, and seek[s] relief that no more directly and 
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large.”  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992). 
                                                                                                                                                  
§ 1291 finality requirement should be given a practical rather than a technical 
construction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Kennedy’s complaint raises only a generalized grievance, alleging that a state 
statute is unconstitutional because it somehow injures the public.  Kennedy has not 
explained why he believes that the statute is unconstitutional, or how the existence of the 
statute has harmed him in any way.  Accordingly, because we agree that Kennedy lacks 
standing to pursue his claims, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
